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Executive Summary
Starting in 2008, major changes to the federal student loan system have increased the
generosity and flexibility of repayment options. In theory, these efforts should reduce the effect
of the business cycle on default patterns. However, since 2007, student loan default rates have
persisted in rising. In response, several student loan advocates have proposed replacing the
standard program with the income-based repayment program as the automatic repayment option.
This stakeholder analysis explores the potential of this proposal from the perspective of
borrowers, academic institutions, and student loan servicers through a literature review of
empirical research of student loan default behaviors, quantitative analysis of cohort default rates,
and exploratory interviews. This research does not strongly support the broad statement that
automatic enrollment in income-based repayment would eliminate the problem of student loan
defaults. However, of all repayment options, the income -based is best suited to meet the needs
of financially stressed borrowers, and the stakeholder analysis uncovers some practical
opportunities to leverage current infrastructures and institutional needs to improve outcomes.
This analysis recommends that the Department of Education consider piloting two default
reduction efforts in order to promote income-based repayment programs: (1) partner with schools
that have the largest number of associated defaulted loans to develop targeted counseling
services prior to loan disbursement and (2) partner with servicers to test the effectiveness of
making the income-based repayment program the automatic option upon entering into
repayment. Though the income-based repayment program will not fully solve the problem of the
rising burden of student loans, it provides a promising structure to reduce the financial burden of
higher education debt.
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Problem in Context
Too many student loan borrowers have gone into default, though the policies around
repayment make default largely avoidable. Following targeted legislation in the early 1990’s to
hold schools accountable for student loan default rates and increase repayment flexibility, annual
measurements of two-year default rates showed a consistent downward trend, reaching a low of
4.9% in 2003 (Chart 1). However, since 2008 default rates have risen 75% to an alarming 9.1%.1
Even more troubling, the Department of Education (ED) estimates a total lifetime default rate of
23%,2 and some analysts worry that ED has underestimated these rates and the related costs.3
Defaulted loans increase the cost to the government of providing a federally guaranteed student
loan program. Furthermore, they result in higher costs to the borrower in the form of collection
fees, marred credit scores, and garnished paychecks and tax returns.
Chart 1 – Two-Year Cohort Default Rates by Year Measured (1989-2012)

Source: Baum, Sandy and Kathleen Payea. “Student Aid Trends.” (CollegeBoard, 2012)

The dollar value of outstanding loans has increased by 62% in the past decade,
amounting to $864 billion in aggregate debt. 4 This combined with higher default rates has led to
increased concerns in the media about the “student loan bubble” and its potential to ignite the
next American financial crisis and/or hamper economic recovery. For example, lower rates of
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home purchases by thirty to forty-year-olds suggests that young adults are over-leveraged and
delaying major “life” expenditures, which are also traditionally drivers of economic recovery.5
Although the correlation with the recession suggests that the problem of default is
primarily economic, the theory behind the current federal repayment policies should effectively
insulate federal loans from economic downturns. Since 1993, Federal Direct Loans have
qualified for repayment programs based upon income, offering repayments as low as $0 and
forgiveness after twenty-five years of keeping loans in good standing. The program did not
initially cover the Family Federal Education Loan Program (FFELP), which promoted student
loans origination by private banks through federal guarantees, and so had limits to the relief it
could provide. Passage of the Income-Based Repayment (IBR) program in 2007 and subsequent
additions of even more generous policies extended access to these repayment options to FFELP
loan holders. (See Appendix I for comparisons between various repayment options).
It is difficult to say whether the programs reduced the impact of the recession on student
loan default rates. However, their correlated rise with the financial crisis strongly suggests that
the program has not yet broken the connection between economic conditions and student loan
default. Several problems in implementation plagued IBR in its early days, such as accidently
omitting it as an option on the Financial Student Aid’s website6 and unexpected servicer transfer
problems.7 Notably, Inside Higher Ed reported last year that, although over 5.4 million
Americans were delinquent on their student loans, only 1.6 million had enrolled in IBR and only
another 447,000 in the income-contingent program. This gap suggests the program has not yet
reached many who could benefit from it.8 Furthermore, due to rising levels of enrollment, tuition,
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and borrowing limits, loan servicers are preparing for Federal Direct programs to rise by 9% over
the next three years, increasing the urgency of the default problem.9
In response to mounting student loan pressures and the apparent gap in IBR enrollment,
several education-related think tanks, including the CollegeBoard, The Institute for College
Access & Success, American National Consumer Law Center, and the Association of University
Women, have endorsed enrollment in IBR programs as a key strategy reducing default rates.10
Some, such as the Committee for Economic Development and Young Invincibles recommend
that the IBR become the default repayment option upon entering repayment, ensuring that
students would not bear unreasonable hardship due underemployment post-graduation.11
While this recommendation appears to be a logical next-step, the theory of its
effectiveness and feasibility rests on several assumptions that deserve further analysis: (1) the
change would effectively target and help the population most prone to student loan default and
(2) the incentive structures of major stakeholders would lead to the desired outcomes. This
analysis attempts to shed light on these two assumptions, as well as assess if different strategies
are necessary based upon loan type or systematic differences between segments in the repaying
population.

Methodology
I approached this analysis as an operational problem, beginning with preliminary
investigations into the various inputs, conducting some initial stress tests, and determining the
areas that merit further consideration. The three major inputs I considered were (1) borrower
needs, (2) institutional drivers of default, and (3) incentives of student loan servicers and
9
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educational institutions in administering federal student loans. I also expanded the definition of
“income-based repayment” (IBR) to include all of the repayment programs that meet two
criteria: no lower limit on monthly repayment amounts and loan forgiveness at some point in
time. Thus, “IBR” in this analysis should be read as a loose definition of program requirements.
Borrower Needs Assessment
Current news articles and research from think tanks studying higher education and/or
financial products informed much of this analysis, particularly in determining variations in
student loan borrower characteristics and potential implementation problems. This analysis
includes information gathered from seven news stories and thirteen reports/press releases from
think tanks. To determine risk factors that lead to default, I reviewed scholarly journal articles
from related disciplines including economics (five articles), education (seven articles), and
public policy and management (one article) found via Google Scholar, JStor, EconLit, WorldCat,
and ProQuest. I also conducted interviews with professionals that work with borrowers of
government subsidized loans, including Nieve Santana, Associate Director of Processing
Services at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Alice Graulty, Match Savings and Cash for
College Coordinator at Foundation Communities in Austin, TX, and Jacki White, Loan Fund
Manager at Neighborworks Housing Services in West Rutland, Vermont.
Analysis of Schools
The Operations Performance Division (OPD) under the Federal Student Aid division
publishes two-year cohort default rates annually. Although this is the most consistent set of
publically available data, it has inherent limitations:


Each cohort year reflects a new group of students.



The data reflect the last school the student attended.



Students entering repayment includes graduates and dropouts.
5

Thus, my analysis of the two-year cohort default rates considers the limitations of the data.
Given the categorical nature of analyzing default rates by school type, I sought to answer
two questions: (1) Are there certain types of schools driving the increase in total default rates?
(2) What is the approximate severity of a school’s default rate if you consider the average size of
the loan and the percentage of students who borrow? For this analysis, I combined ED’s official
default rates with data published by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in 2012.
For comparison purposes, I used rates measured in 2002 for the 2000 two-year cohort,
which marks the beginning of a fairly stable period and the most recent 2012 measurement of the
2010 cohort. Noticing a tremendous increase in the number of students enrolled in the University
of Phoenix, I recoded the for-profits with the largest repayment cohorts as “Ten Largest ForProfits” (see Appendix II for the list of schools). Since the data also lumped together public
schools with a wide range of program lengths and the literature suggests that community college
default patterns significantly differ from four-year institutions, I recoded all public institutions
that did not offer bachelor’s or master’s levels programs as “Community Colleges.” These labels
are not mutually exclusive, as schools often have many types of programs.
Analysis of Student Loan Servicers
For an incentive analysis of the student loan servicers, I looked at three of the four
servicers for organizational analysis: Nelnet, Sallie Mae and Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Agency (PHEAA). I excluded Great Lakes because they did not publish an Annual
Report accessible online. Of these I focused more heavily upon comparisons between Sallie Mae
and PHEAA because they provide strong contrasting models and because of personal access to
their customer service system. I called these servicers many times with questions regarding
details of the programs and cross-checked answers. The organizational analysis also includes an
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assessment of the servicer’s Direct Loan Servicing contract with the ED compared against
revenue potential and risk, as expressed in annual reports to shareholders.
For a “snapshot” of current performance, I developed four questions about IBR options,
all informational in nature, starting with general questions and ending with more complex. To
improve the reliability of this measurement, I recruited classmates who have loans with various
other servicers to call and ask these questions. Six participated and the survey covers all of the
major Direct Loan servicers.

Potential Effectiveness of Income Bases Repayment as Social Insurance
In his first address to Congress, President Obama set a goal to make United States the
world leader in producing college graduates per capita by 2020.12 Since 2002, college enrollment
rates have increased by 34%, although graduation rates are less than 60%.13 This suggests that
many Americans are realizing the need to enroll in higher education, but are leaving before
benefiting from a degree, leading to debt without better credentials. IBR programs reduce the
risk of taking out student loans, acting as a quasi-social insurance plan against crippling financial
hardship.
Like traditional social insurance, the plan one would rationally choose depends upon the
borrower’s expectations for future financial health. Unlike social insurance, once ED pays the
direct loan to the school, all subsequent cash flows move in the direction from the borrower to
the government, and the individual bears the burden of delayed cash flows in the form of accrued
interest. To qualify for the most generous and newest IBR program borrowers must demonstrate
that annual payments under the standard repayment plan would be more than at least 10% of

12
13
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discretionary income, taking into account family size. For a borrower in the first year of
repayment with $20,000 of debt, the annual salary threshold for qualifying for IBR is $40,000,
and for $100,000 of debt, the income threshold jumps to $150,000. This demonstrates that the
programs are generous in their scope of targeted participants.
Chart 2: Comparison of Payment Outcomes Between Plan
Repayment Plan
Standard
IBR

Years to
Repay
10
20

Monthly Payment
$345
$106

IBR
+$20,000 Income in Yr 5

20

Yr 1-5: $106
Yr 6-20: $273

Total Paid in Addition to
Principle
$
13,470
$
(2,652)

Balance Sheet
Forgiveness
$
0
$
54,887

$

$

26,136

6,796

Note: Monthly payment determined by MyFedLoan.org’s Repayment Schedule Estimator. Based upon unmarried
student with no dependents with $30,000 in debt at 6.8% interest rate and stagnant income of $30,000.

As Chart 2 shows, there is great variation in the amount of money a borrower might
actually pay according to the payment plan and their career path. In this stylized example, the
borrower took out $30,000 in Direct Loans, has a job with a stagnant income, and has no change
in family status.14 The monthly IBR payment is a third of the payment under the Standard Plan,
allowing for greater monthly flexibility in repayment. If nothing changes financially for this
borrower, the public insurance kicks in after twenty years of consistent repayment, forgiving
$2,652 of the original principle borrowed, a $15,132 nominal subsidy when compared to the
borrower who stayed in the standard program. However, because of the nature of interest
accrual, if the same student enjoys a major promotion in year five and only pays the minimum
balance each month, s/he winds up paying more twice the amount as the standard borrower.
This variation in the amount borrowers might actually pay is not unique when comparing
repayment plans, even under the old structures. Yet, this scenario illustrates that rational choice

14

With a measurable discount rate, the additional years of repayment make the total payment under IBR consistently
below that of the Standard Program because it is spread across more time (see Appendix III). However, in a situation
where income is stagnant, the nominal effect will be more tangible to the borrower. Furthermore, communications
between borrowers and servicers are presented in nominal values.
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between repayment options depends upon predicting future job prospects. The potential for
moral hazard looms for individuals with high preferences for expensive education and low
preferences for high income.15 However, the future is inherently unpredictable, especially when
people are over-leveraged and have only a small monetary buffer to counter financial
emergencies. Within empirical studies, characteristics leading to an increased likelihood of
default include age, race, parental marriage status and income, borrower’s income, degree
completion, marital status of the borrower, and number of dependents.16 Although the
significance between these characteristics varies, the story they tell is that borrowers are more
likely to default if they have less access to gainful employment, fewer resources to rely on in
case of financial emergencies, and more pressure to choose between uses of disposable income.
Since these studies are based primarily on data from the 1980’s and early 1990’s, they may
underestimate the degree to which the average American is vulnerable to financial hardship.17 By
the early 2000’s the 75% of the average household income was dedicated to fixed monthly costs,
making families particularly vulnerable to exogenous budget shocks and bankruptcy.18 However,
since student loans can very rarely be forgiven in bankruptcy, they create a particularly sticky
commitment for individuals experiencing financial hardship.
One of the potential gaps in IBR programs is that it does not extend to the Parent PLUS
program. Although PLUS loans are considered less risky because they require a credit check,
parents can borrow up to the difference between student federal loans/grants and tuition and the
15

On the public good side of this equation, borrowers who wish to go into low salary public service work may
benefit from the 2008 Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, which forgives student loans after ten years of
documented work in the public sector. On the cost side, variation in total repayment makes the financial stability of
the system unclear. Some experts worry that ED undervalues these costs by as much as $300 billion (Howes, 2012)
16
Hakim & Rashidian. “Student Loan Default” (1995); Volkwein et al. “Factors Associated with Student Loan
Default” (1998) Knapp & Seaks. “An Analysis of the Probability of Default” (1992); Volkwein et al.
17
The ability for researchers to gather and use national-level datasets have presumably been hampered by Section
135 of the 2008 Opportunity and Affordability Act which prohibits ED from developing National Student Loan
Database System for any purposes beyond traditional administrative uses.
18
Warren, Elizabeth. “Collapse of the Middle Class.” (2007)
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application does not require evidence of ability to repay. Student loan borrowers over fifty years
old held nearly 17% of the outstanding past-due balance in 2012 and represent the fastest
growing age group for student loan debt.19 A mixture of factors are likely driving this change
including the possibility that parents may be shifting the financing of their children’s education
away from private loans and towards federal loans (which would ultimately be an accounting
change), increased school enrollment by older students, and increased borrowing due to the
higher cost of school. Nonetheless, those in this population with PLUS loans have very limited
access to flexible repayment programs, even though they may have some systematic
vulnerabilities due to health problems or large fixed expenses.20
The tradeoff between flexibility and the long-term cost of the program is an old
discussion in student lending. In a study from 1977, surveyed students at University of
Pennsylvania preferred the idea of the twenty year repayment plan until they saw the total
interest they would have to pay according to the repayment schedule. At that point they reverted
to preferring the standard plan.21 Although this seems to favor the status quo, the study also
shows that students were able to choose the more responsible payment amount when presented
with the outcomes.
This idea could be very useful in choosing the best implementation options today. In a
recent survey by the Young Invincibles, 60% of recent graduates said that they were “surprised
by the terms of their loans or the student loan process” and 40% claimed had not receive exit
loan counseling before leaving school.22 This may be an overestimate, since exit loan counseling
19

Cooper. “An Educated Mess” (2012), 1. Notably, the author also points out that the over-50 population is less
likely to pay back student loans because of fewer remaining working years. The budgetary cost-benefit of the IBR
program is beyond the scope of this paper, but worthy of further consideration.
20
Parent PLUS loans grew by 40% since 2008, while private loans decreased by 33%, suggesting that some of the
change might be due to shifting sources for additional college funding. (Data from Baum, Trends, 2012)
21
Brugal. “The Demand for Student Loans” (1977), 81
22
Mishory & O’Sullivan. Student Perspective. (2012), 13
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can require as little as an online quiz that students may click through. However, these numbers
also highlight that most students do not have a full understanding of the terms that they are
agreeing to before borrowing student loans and are unpleasantly surprised when the first
payment comes due. Furthermore, the survey showed that 89% of respondents strongly agreed
that the IBR program should be the automatic repayment option when they started paying back
their loans, suggesting that recent graduates currently desire more flexibility. 23
Although there is no empirical research on repayment structures’ effect on default rates, a
recent theoretical model suggests that flexibility in repayment amounts and locked-in interest
rates are key factors in reducing default rates.24 This also implies that increased complexity
might have negative consequences, even if the complexity may mathematically add to a less
expensive outcome overall. The combination of eight repayment options available for three or
four types of loans—often spread out amongst multiple servicers—creates a scenario that is ripe
for lower engagement due to choice fatigue. Following a “paternalistic libertarian” model
founded in behavioral economics, we would want to simplify options and encourage the optimal
solution for the student and society.25 However, it is also important to consider whether the
population that drives changes in default rates require specific outreach efforts.

Primary Drivers of Default Rates & Targeting Strategies
Although the intuition behind the student loan system largely assumes that borrowers are
youth with little to no credit history, the University of Phoenix’s parent company noted in their
2012 annual report that they estimate that 73% of students were “non-traditional.”26 This large

23
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proportion of non-traditional students further suggests that the theory behind default reduction
efforts should not assume that the target population is twenty-three year old college graduates.
By breaking down the change in defaulters over repayers by school type between 2000
and 2010 (see Appendix IV for calculations), we see that the ten largest for-profit institutions
account for 41% of the total 3.75% increase over the past decade (Chart 3). When combined with
other 1866 proprietary schools, for-profits account for over 68.3% of the increase in default
rates, followed by publicly funded community colleges, which account for 22.8%. All of the
two-year cohort default rates reflect low estimates of actual default and may bias these numbers
towards populations that may default early during the lifetime of the loan. 27 However, the twoyear cohort measure likely underestimates default rates for for-profits. In 2012, the U.S. Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions found that many for-profit operations
have committed “significant resources to
sophisticated operations that keep students
out of default for the duration of the 2-year
(and now 3-year) monitoring window by

Chart 3 - Drivers of Change in
Default Rates
2000-2010 by School Type
Ten Largest ForProfits
For-Profit Schools

4.7% 4.2%

aggressively signing students up for
forbearance and deferment.”28
Nonetheless, the power of these top

"Community College"

22.8%

41.0%

Public School, 4+
Years
Nonprofit Private
Schools

27.3%

ten schools in driving up default does not
lie in the default rate change, but in the

Data Source: U.S. Department of Education. Two-Year Official
Cohort Default Rates for Schools (2000 & 2010 Cohorts)

overall increase in enrollment in that sector. Enrollment in for-profit institutions has increased by
27

All two-year default rates should be considered to be a low estimate. In a 2006 longitudinal study of the 1993
Cohort, Susan Choy and Xiaoje Li found that student loan default rates peaked at four years and that 33% of
borrowers were still repaying after ten years. Of those still making payments,11% were paying more than $250 per
month (Choi & Li, 2006).
28
U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. For Profit Higher Education:(2012), 151
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more 450% over the last decade, compared to 30% for 4-year public institutions and nonprofits.29 Unfortunately, the schools with the largest gains also have the lowest 6-year graduation
rates of 22%, compared to 55% for public institution, further underscoring that much of the
increase in student loan defaults is unaccompanied by increases in degree-attainment.30 The
increase in enrollments seen by all school types suggests that the for-profit market has not
cannibalized more traditional programs, perhaps providing accessible options to students in a
time when the recession has ignited demand for higher education. All of the schools included in
the “top-ten” have online programs, and presumably a large portion of the increase of
enrollments is connected to these offerings. More recently, enrollments have started to decline.
University of Phoenix cites the adverse publicity stemming from increased scrutiny in the media
and by the government as a likely cause, though they also may be reaching market saturation.31
As striking as these numbers are, empirical research does not support the conclusion that
entering a for-profit institution increases an individual’s chances of defaulting. Once
employment, income, graduation status, and race are included in a multivariate regression
analysis, none of the empirical studies reviewed for this analysis showed a statistically
significant relationship between institution type and default.32 However, cause-effect relationship
between school-type, graduation rates and future employment is still unclear, lending to an active
debate as to whether institutions should be held accountable for their default rates. Some studies
have shown that increased support of students in school reduces default rates,33 while others
suggest the opposite.34 A 2010 study by the independent think tank, Education Sector, finds that
29
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32
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schools’ student-faculty ratios consistently predicted lower default rates after disaggregating
populations by school-type, suggesting that context-specific one-on-one interaction supports
reduced defaults.35 This study also found that lower retention rates were significantly correlated
with higher default rates for four-year institutions, but not two-year. This lack of significance is
not encouraging for community colleges and two-year for-profit institutions as it implies that
gaining a two-year degree does not reduce likelihood of financial hardship leading to default.
Though, some studies suggest that attending a for-profit institution for an associates’ degree
raises the likelihood of completion by as much as nine percentage points, this would unlikely
help in reducing default rates for large portions of their student body.36
Although default rates for for-profits are comparable to community colleges, the
accompanying size of the loans are not. The average federal loan held by a community college
student is only $4,093, about 35% less than the average loan held by a for-profit student in a twoyear program.37 Furthermore, approximately 85.6% of students in community college owe no
student loans, compared to only 3.3% in two-year for-profit programs.38 From statistics provided
in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Private Loans report, it is possible to estimate the
approximate amount of default of federal loans expected for one-hundred students entering a
program by school-type (Chart 4; see Appendix IV for calculations).
Taking one year of costs into consideration, the expected dollar amount of default of the
top ten largest for profit institutions is more than ten times larger than community colleges and
more than twice that of public institutions. When considering the length of programs and the

35

Dillon & Smiles. Lowering Student Loan Default. (2011) 19-23
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37
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total amount of debt accumulated, the proportions may change somewhat.39 However, this graph
clearly illustrates the burden created when tuitions drive up the borrowing of student loans for
populations with high risks of default.
Chart 4: Expected Feferal Default by School Type Per 100
Students
(calculated assuming two semesters of borrowing)
$100,000

$90,230

$80,000

$66,945

$60,000
$40,000
$22,344
$20,000

$17,051
$6,194

$10 Largest ForProfits

Private for-Profit

Private Not-forProfit

Public 4-Year

Community
Colleges

The effect of the growth of just a few institutions has important implications regarding
targeting efforts to lower default rates. The largest of these schools have large recruitment efforts
and tuition support, spending around 25% on revenue on admissions and marketing efforts,
suggesting that the target population responds positively to proactive guidance.40 Alice Graulty,
Cash for College Coordinator at Foundations Communities in Austin, TX noted that many of her
clients who need to clear up past for-profit student loan debt do not realize that they even have
outstanding debt because the school had taken care of the loan process.41 Businesswise, this
helps remove the “hassle cost” of paperwork on enrollment decisions, which undecided and non-

39

However, higher debt due to more time in school does not appear to have a linear relationship with default,
perhaps due to the “persistence” of students that stay in school longer (Herr & Burt, Predicting (2005), 43),
suggesting that these proportions may remain even after weighted by years in school.
40
Ibid.8. For example. The Apollo Group, parent company of University of Phoenix, spent approximately 25% of its
$4.2B in revenue on marketing and admissions advisory. (Apollo Group, Annual Report (2012), 53).
41
Graulty, Alice, Phone Interview. (March 28, 2013)
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traditional students may experience more intensely. 42 Thus, efforts to reduce default rates for this
large portion of students entering repayment should include engagement at the point of loan, and
be as simple and proactive as possible.
From a partnership-development perspective, there appears to be several opportunities for
working with for-profits on financial education and default reduction efforts. The advantages of
working with the largest for-profits include access to students at the point of making a loan and
well-funded administrative personnel support and marketing. While research only loosely
supports the effectiveness of counseling in reducing student loan default rates, research from the
nonprofits working with high risk populations in homeownership indicates that counseling helps
in guiding borrowers to smarter repayment options, but not in reducing default propensities.43
Jacki White, Loan Fund Manager at NeighborWorks of Western Vermont, echoed this sentiment,
“When we are intense in emphasizing what will happen [if they do not repay], the better the
behavior… when people do not know what to do, they try to ignore the problem hoping it will go
away, but it doesn’t.”44 Thus, there could be a major education opportunity to promote the IBR
programs early on if it is framed as a strategy to enroll borrowers in a “smarter” plan and
emphasizes the serious consequences for avoiding student loans once in repayment. With
enrollment numbers down, there may be some reluctance to discuss the seriousness of loan
repayment options for fear of scaring away customers in their target market. Nonetheless, the
corporate for-profits will need to strategize ways to reduce negative publicity due to high default
rates, and IBR programs may provide a particularly convenient way to do so.
However, the larger issues of increasing student debt without correlating educational
outcomes have broader public value implications, which an overly successful IBR effort might
42

Orfield. “Money Equity” (1992) 95
Quercia & Spader. “Homeownership Counseling” (2008) 304
44
White, Jacki, In-person interview. (April 5, 2013)
43
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hide. It seems reasonable incorporate size, cost, and percentage of students borrowing into
federal loan eligibility calculations, in order to promote less expensive use of taxpayer resources
for underwriting access to education. Recently proposed gainful employment rules attempted to
change regulations in that spirit, although a federal judge vacated them in March 2013.45
Another, strategy would be to increase Pell Grant access and lower loan limits for the first year
of school to decrease initial student debt and allow folks to “try out” higher education with less
upfront risk.46 A cost benefit analysis would be necessary to assess the budgetary and social
impacts of this strategy.

Incentives of Student Loan Servicers
Over the past several years, student loan servicers have seen tremendous changes in their
revenue generation due to the major shifts in the structure of federal student loans. From 1965 to
2010, many servicers of federal loans also lent federally guaranteed loans through the FFELP.
This created a system where banks and lenders could grant loans to students with a guarantee
from the federal government that they would be largely repaid. From 2000 to 2010, 72% of loans
guaranteed by the federal government were originated through this structure, equivalent to
approximately $426.2 billion before interest accrual.47
The program was designed to incentivize banks to lend to students at or below a
maximum interest rate of 7.9%, a relatively low rate for lending to those with no credit history.48
However, servicers could also be collectors of defaulted loans, and so revenue generation could

45

Bidwell, “Judge Refuses to Restore Vacated Provisions of 'Gainful Employment' Rule” (2013). These Gainful
Employment rules stated that for-profits must meet at least one of three benchmarks that indicate either a third of
graduates are repaying their loans or median debt is not above a third of graduates’ income.
46
Kane, Thomas. Price of Admission. (1999)
47
Calculated data from Baum & Payee. Trends. (2012)
48
Kantrowitz. “Direct Loans vs. FFEL”

17

include servicing fees, maximizing interest payments by allowing for the maximum amount of
forbearance, and additional collection fees up to 16.2% o of the outstanding loan once a
borrower enters default.49 In an episode of 60 Minutes in 2006, then Harvard professor and
bankruptcy expert Elizabeth Warren warned that the current structure allowed for lenders to
“play every hand at the poker table.”50
From the perspective of the cost to the government, supporting the FFELP system cost
twice as much as direct loans; the subsidy structure reimbursed collection agencies for successful
collection efforts on defaulted loans and for defaulted loans with low repayment prospects.51
When the Obama Administration ended the program in 2010, the Congressional Budget Office
estimated $68.7 billion in savings for the federal government over 10 years.52
For servicers like Sallie Mae and PHEAA, this resulted in significant losses on their
balance sheets. In addition to cash flows related directly to the loan, portfolios of loans could be
repackaged and sold to investors as low-risk student loan asset backed securities (SLABS) and
provide a second source for revenue through the financial markets.53 Although the program
ended two years ago and the related assets will amortize over the next twenty years, FFELP
related services currently generate 72% of student loan related revenue for Sallie Mae.54
Since 2010, the Department of Education has been the sole originator of Direct Student
Loans. The servicing for the repayment of these loans is contracted out to a combination of four
major servicers--Sallie Mae, PHEAA, Nelnet, and Great Lakes—and thirteen smaller servicers.
Nelnet and Sallie Mae are for-profit public companies, while the rest are non-profits, many of
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New York State Higher Education Services Corporation.
Jaschick. “60 Minutes’ vs. Sallie Mae.” (2006)
51
Lucas & Moore, “Guaranteed versus Direct Lending: The Case of Student Loans.” (2010) 17
52
New America Foundation. “Federal Student Loans History.” (March, 2012)
53
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which also service state grants and financial aid. The new contracts created by the ED pay these
servicers on a per-unit basis based upon the composition of borrowers in repayment; servicers
receive $2.11 per month for students in good standing and only $0.50 for students in default (see
Appendix VI for Price Table). Annual allocations of student loans are based upon a formula that
includes default status per unit, total defaulted dollars outstanding, and survey ratings by
borrowers, schools, and the U.S. Office of Student Aid (Appendix VII).
When considering the scope of the contract only, it appears that student loan servicers
have every incentive to keep students in good standing for repayment since future market shares
of the Direct Loan business units rely winning contracts based upon good default aversion
outcomes and customer service. However, this contract with the Federal Government accounts
for only 1.3% of Sallie Mae’s annual revenues—generating $84 million compared to $2.7 billion
in FFELP and $2.5 billion in consumer servicing revenues.55 From a business perspective, the
new structure does not provide much of a growth market compared to other consumer lending
activities. Accordingly, Sallie Mae’s primary strategies for delivering shareholder value do not
include federal direct loans. Instead, management is focusing on growing consumer-lending
segment assets and revenues, reducing operating expenses, and maximizing cash flows from
FFELP Loans.56 The lack of attention towards Direct Loans from the country’s largest servicer
shows. In the 2012 ED Allocation Metric, it ranked last in overall performance (Appendix VII).
From the outside, it is difficult to assess the level of any of the company’s commitments
to meeting the spirit of the new contract structure. The company that scored highest in customer
service was PHEAA, a non-profit organization with $497.4 million in 2012 operating revenues

55
56

Ibid. 9 & 41
Ibid. 52
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that uses profits from its operations to generate grant aid in Pennsylvania.57 It appears to be
taking on federal student loan servicing with gusto, creating a separate website called
“Myfedloans.org” and aggressively seeking out and winning special contracts, such as the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness Program. Furthermore a “snapshot” customer service survey of the
four major servicers revealed little meaningful variation in the content of answers and
friendliness of customer service representatives (see Appendix VIII).58
Still, it is possible to consider current market incentives and consider their likely impact
on repayment counseling and internal policies. Under the current system, counseling is highly
customized to the borrower’s situation and the nature of the advice appears to lean towards
encouragement of early repayment and the promotion of the new Public Service Loan
Forgiveness Program.59 Servicers were quite open to talking about the usefulness of IBR in
helping folks get through economic hardship.
Although actual overhead costs related to Direct Loan servicing are not published,
servicers presumably have several overhead costs that currently make IBR more costly than the
standard program due to the annual paperwork requirements for income verification. In theory,
the value of getting students at risk of default into IBR would equal the loss that they would
expect to undergo without the program. Assuming a 4% annual increase in the number of high
risk borrowers entering repayment per year and three million borrowers entering repayment per
year, the value of default-aversion activities could be as high as $2.3 million annually. However,
isolating the high risk population is a challenge, especially considering that the average
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PHEAA. Annual Report. (2012) 22
This assessment is biased by the fact that all contact with servicers was proactive and prior to the actual
repayment period, which means that these observed tendencies should not indicate the absolute reality of servicers’
counseling behavior, but instructive nonetheless.
59
Based upon various conversations with representatives of Sallie Mae and MyFedLoan.org. Also, reflected in the
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American is now more vulnerable to unexpected financial emergencies than in the recent past.
Some targeting efforts under the status quo could include flagging students that dropped out of
their programs or developing outreach efforts to those who also received Pell Grants—which
correlate well with pre-loan predictors of default.60
Despite additional annual paperwork, making the IBR program the automatic option
would have several benefits for servicers. Currently there are so many repayment options that
counselors need significant training to help students find the best options given their situation,
which can include heavy training and personnel costs. Simplified choices would likely reduce
these.61 It would also provide the output of higher IBR enrollment, likely reducing defaults and
increase access to higher fees under the servicing contract.
On the practical side of implementation, determining the income necessary to calculate
the repayment amount, especially on the first bill, could prove to be a significant challenge, and
presents certain tradeoffs. If the initial bill is too small, the borrower who is new to repayment
may underestimate the cost of paying too little in the beginning of repayment, creating a situation
where the borrower ultimately pays more for their student loan.62 However, a bill that is too large
might create panic and lead to unproductive avoidance behavior. Considering that payments
generally begins six months after entering repayment, the borrower who completed a spring
semester would only have four months to get into trouble before tax season creates a natural
opportunity to reassess the minimum repayment amount. For those who drop out or graduate in
December, however, the window would be large enough for an individual to reach default status.
Early and intense messaging about first the availability of help, second the accrued interest that
60

Dillon & Smiles. Lowering Student Loan Default. (2011) 19-23
Based upon April 17, 2013 phone conversation with a public relations manager at MyFedLoan.org. He also noted
that the company maintains an agnostic public position related to federal repayment initiatives and policies.
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Including an estimate for total payments considering minimum repayment, might be enough incentive to promote
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might build with minimum payments, and finally the consequences for avoiding repayment
could nudge borrowers to in fixing account problem early. Even though automatic enrollment in
IBR would likely still have flaws, these problems could even help encourage borrower
engagement early in the process. A combination of automatic enrollment in IBR and careful
messaging contrasts with the current standard structure which appears to rely more heavily on
proactive borrower inquiry.
The benefits to the servicer of transferring old FFELP loans into an IBR, whether on a
case-by-case basis or through an automatic program, is less clear. As mentioned, servicers
generate revenue under the FFELP program through collecting interest, servicing fees, collection
fees, and income related to the conversion of student loan portfolios into SLABS and selling
them to traders in the financial market. The changes in the 2008 legislation altered this formula,
allowing FFELP loans to be covered by IBR, whether consolidated with Direct Loans or not, and
opening a door to loan forgiveness.
Considering this and the loss of access to new guaranteed loans, a great deal of emphasis
has shifted to packaging private loans and presumably old FFELP loans into securities for
investors. Although the asset backed securities market largely lost salience during the financial
crisis, SLABS appear to be regaining some momentum as higher risk, but higher yield
investments. As recently as March, Sallie Mae sold $1.1 billion worth of new student loan
securities to Wall Street.63 Although the portfolio of assets used to create these securities likely
consists of private loans, the critical point is that securitization invites investors to influence the
servicers’ corporate logic. Should actively traded SLABS include FFELP loans, servicers would
have additional contractual obligations to the shareholders about the handling of the accounts.
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This could create incentives that do not benefit the student loan borrower, and may skew internal
policies for servicing old loans. Thus, the calculus of “maximizing cash flows from the FFELP
program” may include supportive counseling in order to improve the stability of the security.
However, it could also include allowing delinquency and default to work in the servicer’s favor
in the form of fees and ballooning principal. Considering the forgiveness aspect of the IBR
program, it doesn’t seem logical for servicers to proactively promote this program to borrowers
with FFELP loans, as it could result in an eventual loss for the investors.

Discussion of IBR Implementation Options
IBR is an example of a policy that should have a resounding effect in reducing default
rates as it provides a generous and flexible answer to an individual’s financial hardships. From
diving into the literature and recent news of the program, it appears that it still may be too early
to assess the programs potential effectiveness, given the time necessary to fundamentally change
the loan origination and repayment structures. Furthermore, only three cohorts of students
entering repayment under the new structure have been measured, further underscoring the
limitations for assessing success. After all, cohort default rates did not drop for two years after
the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, assuming that the decrease was not confounded
by other factors from the time (see Chart 1 for reference).
In determining whether to make IBR programs the automatic option, certain probable
limits should be recognized. First, the program would not solve some underlying issues with the
highest risk population. In my interview with Foundation Communities’ Cash for College
Coordinator, Graulty pointed out that many who come to speak with her know that they have
debt, but have trouble keeping track of it because they have moved several times and do not have
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easy access to a computer.64 More proactive default reduction outreach efforts would likely be
necessary to effectively meet the needs of this population. Furthermore, there may be alternative
reasons why people go into default that go beyond ability to pay. For instance, in a survey of a
small sample of defaulted borrowers seeking legal aid, 47% said that they should not have to
repay. The two primary reasons included uselessness of the degree and frustration about having
already paid multiples of the principle.65 However, the actual size of this population is unknown,
and these sentiments may be partially avoided if repayment amounts better match ability to pay.
Furthermore, although the program might add value in financial leniency, making it the
automatic option would add some burden of paperwork to the borrower due to the need to
provide annual proof of income. Currently, the IBR online qualification system is connected with
the Internal Revenue Service’s system, making it fairly simple to prove income requirements.
However, the system is very particular about inputs and will not work if there is variation from
last year’s tax return. For example an error will occur if you input “apt” instead of “apartment” in
the address field.66 Some customers may not appreciate yearly interaction with servicers in order
to prove income. However, if the program is linked with tax preparation, the burden of an extra
interaction could be largely reduced. Considering that the official threshold for “default status” is
270 days delinquent, this leaves a window of only 96 days where a person could go into full
default without having their income incorporated into the repayment formula.
More targeted populations could be selected to be automatically enrolled in IBR, which
could be combined with upfront counseling initiatives or requirements based upon at risk
populations. For instance, targeting students who have also received Pell Grants for increased
loan counseling and automatic enrollment in the income-based repayment program could
64
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improve the programs impact without the negative implications that might accompany other
targeting methods. Students who drop out of their programs could also be flagged. However, by
targeting specific populations, the loan servicers would likely gain fewer cost reductions related
to the level of expertise necessary to effectively guide students to the best available program,
which may reduce buy-in from this important stakeholder.
Whether the status quo is maintained or IBR as an automatic option is extended to all
new cohorts entering repayment, the population’s old loans under the FFELP program present a
unique challenge. Since the last FFELP loan was issued as recently as 2010, borrowers will
continue to be repaying under this framework for many more years, and the incentive suggests
that servicers may not proactively recommend IBR to this population. However, mandating that
servicers transfer all old FFELP loans into an IBR plan may not be an appropriate solution either.
There are 37 million people currently in repayment and 7 million who have entered repayment
since the end of the FFELP program. Since 72% of loans under the old structure were through
FFELP, we can conservatively estimate that 70% of the loans held by 30 million Americans are
still in this program.67 Requiring that all of these people report their income in order to calculate
the IBR payment would be a complicated and costly undertaking, and would likely confuse
people who are currently in good standing with their loans. Thus, a more feasible option for the
federal government might be to offer targeted educational and incentive programs so that those
who would benefit from the program might self-select. Analyzing the FFELP and Direct Loan
consolidation initiative in 2011 might provide some insights as to the best approach. A second
option would be to pay special attention to the defaulting behavior on older loans and to provide
some incentives (or rules) to servicers for proactively transferring delinquent borrowers to
flexible payment plans.
67
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Recommendation
Even considering these caveats, the generosity and flexibility that IBR offers seems to
meet the needs of many who are unnecessarily suffering from high student loan payments. In
order to explore the best way to improve the impact of the program, I recommend developing
two pilot programs. First, since much of the rise in the default rate can be traced to just ten forprofit institutions and those same institutions are suffering from the negative publicity related to
increased default rates, there is a unique opportunity to make a large impact by developing a few
key partnerships with for-profit institutions. A pilot program could test various counseling
techniques to promote education about the current flexibilities of the current financial aid
structure, as well as serious consequences associated with avoiding repayment, especially prior
to the disbursement of the loan. Such an initiative would target the right population, leverage
well-funded admission resources that already exist in these schools, and likely help these forprofits in reducing the risks and poor publicity associated with high default rates.
Second, ED should partner with servicers to test making IBR programs the automatic
option for borrowers entering repayment, especially testing whether it (1) negatively impacts
default rates and (2) systematically impacts some groups more than others. This would improve
understanding of the effectiveness of IBR and help inform future policy decisions. Participating
servicers would also benefit from increased revenue due to the higher per unit fees related to
effective default prevention and better internal understanding default reduction techniques that
may result in a competitive advantage for future contracts.
Following these recommendations would allow for data-driven implementation
improvements within the federal student loan system. More broadly, efforts to reduce the
financial risk of higher education debt supports the ambition that Americans, no matter their
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situation, can strive to better their own lives. Higher education is increasingly a prerequisite for
individuals to join the middle class and for nations to maintain their global competitiveness.
However, rising costs of education and tighter markets also increases its financial riskiness to the
individual. Thus, meeting the financial needs of those who try to obtain a degree is a key aspect
in achieving the President’s goal to be the most educated country in the world.
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Appendices
Appendix I – Student Loan Comparisons
Date Inacted
Implementation
Notes

Standard
Income-Contingent
*NA
7/1/1994
*in 2009 government
*None
began originating all
federally guaranteed loans

Restricted to

NA

*None

Loans that Qualify

*All direct loans, FFEL
loans

*Federal Direct loans

Loans that Don't
Qualify

*Private

Minimum Payment
Payment Formula

*Defaulted loans*
*FFEL Loans (cannot
consolidate)
*Parent PLUS loans
*Private loans
*$50
*$0
*Based on total loans and *Adjusted gross family
10 years to repay
income and family size
*Complex formula based
upon adjusted gross family
income and family size
*Recalculated annually

Income-Based
Pay as You Earn
Public Service Loan Forgivenes
7/1/2009
12/21/2012
10/1/2007
*Not added to repayment *None reported
*Tracking form became
on drop-down menu until
available January 2012
March 2010
*October 2011, DOE rolled
out new website and
there were majore delays
in enrollment in IBR
(included 50,000 who
wound up "defaulting"
due to glitches)
*Partial Financial Hardship - *Partial Financial Hardship - *Borrowers working in
Standard payment/mo > Standard payment/mo > public service
Income Based program
Pay as You Earn program *Repayments made after
*Do not qualify for "Pay as *New Borrowers
October 1, 2007
You Earn"
*Federal Direct loans
*FFEL loans

*Federal Direct loans
*Consolidated FFEL loans

*Defaulted loans*
*FFEL Loans (must
consolidate)
*Parent PLUS loans
*Private loans
*$0
*15% of adjusted gross
family income (income 150% of poverty line) and
family size
*Recalculated annually

*Defaulted loans*
*FFEL Loans (must
consolidate)
*Parent PLUS loans
*Private loans
*$0
*10% of adjusted gross
family income (income 150% of poverty line) and
family size
*Recalculated annually

*Federal Direct (all,
including Parent PLUS)
*Consolidated FFEL loans
*Extended and graduated
payments
*FFEL loans
*Private loans
*$0
*Pay as you earn, IBR, ICR,
standard, any plan
equivalent to standard

Discharge
Notes

NA
*25 years
*25 years
*20 years
*10 years
*According to a discussion with a Sallie Mae representative about my FFELP loans - if your account is >90 days due, you are in "default" and
there will be a late fee. However, they can put your account into forbearance retroactively to put you back in good standing and get you
into a program. Also, you can make payments to rehabilitate your loan, and then qualify for the program. (4/11/13)

Sources

http://www.myfedloan.org/billing-payment/payment-plans/index.shtml
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/04/18/problems-plague-education-department-debt-management-process
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2011/03/23/income-based-vs-income-contingent-loan-repayment
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Appendix II – For-Profits Recoded to “Ten Largest For-Profits”
Top Ten Largest For-Profits by Number Entering Repayment in 2010
NAME
University of Phoenix
ITT Technical Institute
Kaplan University
DeVry University
Ashford University
Strayer University
Colorado Technical University
American InterContinental University
Grand Canyon University
Walden University

State
Arizona
Indiana
Iowa
Illinois
Iowa
District of Columbia
Colorado
Illinois
Arizona
Minnesota

Defaulted
Program Length Borrowers
Master's or Doctor's
41,148
Master's or Doctor's
7,127
Master's or Doctor's
7,053
Master's or Doctor's
4,361
Master's or Doctor's
2,494
Master's or Doctor's
1,912
Master's or Doctor's
2,399
Master's or Doctor's
2,497
Master's or Doctor's
1,994
Master's or Doctor's
368

Entered
Repayment
229,393
42,959
41,819
32,588
24,319
22,219
18,065
17,598
16,490
12,882

Default
Rate
18%
17%
17%
13%
10%
9%
13%
14%
12%
3%

Source: U.S. Department of Education. Two-Year Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools (2000 & 2010 Cohorts)

Appendix III – Comparison of Outcomes Between Plans with Net Present Values
Comparison of Payment Outcomes Between Plans
Account Plan

Payment Plan

Nominal Payments

Years to
Repay

Monthly
Payment

4% Discount Rate

Total Nominal
Nominal
NPV of Total
Nominal Payment Less Balance Sheet
Payment Less
Payment
Principle Forgiveness NPV Payment
Principle

Standard

10

$345

$ 43,470

$

13,470

$

IBR

20

$106

$ 27,348

$

(2,652) $

7% Discount Rate
NPV Balance
NPV of Total NPV Balance
Sheet
NPV Payment Less
Sheet
Forgiveness Payment2
Principle3 Forgiveness4

-

$

34,278

$

(890) $

54,887

$

19,719

$

(15,552) $

-

$ 29,110

$

(890) $

25,100

$ 14,448

$

(15,552) $

14,212

IBR
+$20,000
Yr 1-5: $106
Income in Yr 5
20 Yr 6-20: $273 $ 56,136 $
26,136 $
6,796 $
21,997 $ (14,028)
$3,102 $ 15,972 $
(14,028) $
1,756
Note: Based upon unmarried student with no dependents, stagnant income, and $30,000 in debt at 6.8% interest rate.Calculated using MyFedLoan.org's Repayment Schedule
Estimator, under the "Pay as You Earn" Program.

Appendix IV – Calculations for Drivers of the Change in Default Rates, 2000-2010
PP=Percentage Point Change in Default by School-Type
D=Number of defaulters by School-Type
TR=Total Number Entering Repayment
TC=Total Change in Default Rate
PP=(D10 / TR10) – (D00 /TR00)
Drivers of Change in Default Rate = PP/TC
2002 Measure of 2000 Cohort

School Type
Ten Largest
For-Profits
For-Profit
Schools
"Community
College"
Public School,
4+ Years
Nonprofit
Private
Schools
Total

# Institutions

# Repayers # Defaulters

2012 Measure of 2010 Cohort
Defaulters/
Total Repayers # Institutions

# Repayers

Defaulters/
# Defaulters Total Repayers

Percentage
Point Change
in Default

Driver of
Default Rate
Change

9

53,429

3,533

0.1%

10

458,332

71,353

1.7%

1.5%

41.0%

1,809

317,925

28,262

1.2%

1,866

816,316

93,924

2.2%

1.0%

27.3%

1,356

307,252

26,583

1.1%

1,169

629,356

83,739

2.0%

0.9%

22.8%

583

1,015,307

44,706

1.9%

634

1,404,957

87,431

2.1%

0.2%

4.7%

1,756
5,513

665,907
2,359,820

23,232
126,316

1.0%
5.4%

1,633
5,312

910,462
4,219,423

48,151
384,598

1.1%
9.1%

0.2%
3.8%

4.2%

Source: U.S. Department of Education. Two-Year Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools (2000 & 2010 Cohorts)
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Appendix IV – Calculating
Percentage of Students Borrowing by Loan and School Type
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

No Loans
Both Non-Private
and Private Loans
Non-Private Loans
Only
Private Loans Only

Source: CFPB. Private Student Loans. (2012)

Calculation of Expected Dollars ind Default
Federal Loans
NonSchool Type (when mixed
Private
with private) Loans Only
5,923
6,477
10 Largest For-Profits
5,923
6,477
Private for-Profit
6,641
8,160
Private Not-for-Profit
5,595
6,706
Public 4-Year
3,831
4,093
Community Colleges

Federal Loans
(when mixed
with private)
44.7
44.7
20.6
9.6
1.9

Non-Private
Loans Only
49
49
34.9
33
9.6

Federal $ per
100 entering
repayment
582131.1
582131.1
421588.6
275010
46571.7

Total
Default Percenta
Expected
Rates
ge
Default
16%
$ 90,230
12%
$ 66,945
5%
$ 22,344
6%
$ 17,051
13%
$
6,194

Source: CFPB. Private Loans. (2013); ED Official 2 Year Cohort Default Rates(2012)
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Appendix VI
Current ED Contract with Student Loan Servicers
Status
Borrowers in School Status

Volume Low

Volume High

Unit Price

na

na

$

1.05

1

3,000,000

$

2.11

3,000,001

UP

$

1.90

1

1,600,000

$

2.07

1,600,001

UP

$

1.73

Borrowers 31-90 Days Delinquent

na

na

$

1.62

Borrowers 91-150 Days Delinquent

na

na

$

1.50

Borrowers 151-270 Days Delinquent

na

na

$

1.37

Borrowers 270+ Days Delinquent

na

na

$

0.50

Borrowers in Grace or Current Repayment Status
Borrowers in Deferment or Forbearance

Source: Title IV Student Loan Management/Servicing. Sallie Mae Redacted Contract Award (June 6, 2013)
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=c845bdd7d98de24fe163b8a55e5f76a8&tab=core&_cview=1
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Appendix VIII – Customer Service Survey Results
I’m particularly curious about the
If I am without work
income based program. Under what Are there problems with
Loan Service
when my grace period
conditions would you recommend the income based
Provider (required) ends, what would you
that I enroll in the income based
repayment program?
recommend I do?
program? Why?

Theoretically - What if I get a very
well paying job after 18 years in
the income based repayment
program? Would I have to start
the standard program again from
year 0?

FedLoan Servicing

Defer

Economic Hardship

Must reapply each year

na

10

Sallie Mae

Defer

Qualification

Not qualifying

Reapply

5

Nelnet

IBR & Defer

Economic Hardship

Interest accrual

9

Great Lakes

IBR & Defer

Offered technical help to enroll

Interest accrual

Have to start paying at higher rate
Do not lose 18 years of repayment
history
No.

10

Great Lakes

Defer

Qualification

No.

10

FedLoan Servicing

Defer

Offered technical help to enroll

Interest accrual although forgiven after
25 years
Longer process

No.

9

Rating of
Customer
Service
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